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A Call to Congress: A Constitutional 
Indian Child Welfare Act is Not a Flawless 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
Maci Burke† 
 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA),1 to regulate the removal and placement of Indian children 
in foster care, the termination of parental rights, preadoptive 
placement, and adoptive placement.2 The ICWA was enacted “to 
address rising concerns over ‘abusive child welfare practices that 
resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from 
their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, 
usually in non-Indian homes.’”3 The ICWA refers to Native 
Americans as “Indians,” thus, I will also refer to Native Americans 
as “Indians” to employ consistent language with the ICWA. The 
ICWA’s stated purpose is to: 
 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the 
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the 
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal 
of Indian children from their families and the placement of such 
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the 
unique values of Indian culture . . . .4 
 
Unfortunately, Congress’ goals of protecting Indian children 
while also maintaining Indian culture sometimes conflict.5 Most 
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 1. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963. 
 2. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). 
 3. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 416 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Miss. Band 
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989)). 
 4. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
 5. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 638 (2013) (holding, in part, 
that the ICWA does not protect parents from involuntary termination of parental 
rights for Indian children where the parent never had custody of the child); Miss. 
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recently, the ICWA has been challenged on Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection grounds in Brackeen v. Bernhardt.6 Brackeen is the 
first case challenging the ICWA on equal protection grounds to be 
decided in a federal Circuit Court of Appeals.7 In Brackeen, the Fifth 
Circuit grappled with the ICWA’s definitional boundaries, 
particularly whether the definition of an “Indian child” constitutes 
a race-based or political classification.8 Race-based classifications 
are subject to strict scrutiny review,9 while political classifications 
are subject to rational basis review.10 Because surviving strict 
scrutiny review is nearly impossible,11 a holding that the ICWA’s 
“Indian child” definition12 is race-based, and subject to strict 
scrutiny, would likely result in a court overturning the ICWA in its 
entirety.13 
While the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas agreed with the plaintiffs in Brackeen, holding the ICWA 
unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the 
“Indian child” classification is political and constitutional.14 
However, the Fifth Circuit has ordered the case be reheard en 
 
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 51–53 (1989) (holding that 
children were domiciled on an Indian reservation despite a parent choosing to give 
birth off the reservation to facilitate their adoption by non-Indian parents, and that 
they would therefore still be covered under the ICWA umbrella); A.D. by Carter v. 
Washburn, 2017 WL 1019685, at *6–8 (2017) (dismissing equal protection challenges 
to the ICWA’s active efforts provision, adoptive placement preferences, and burdens 
of proof for Indian child removal and termination of parental rights for lack of 
standing). 
 6. See Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 416. 
 7. See  Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application 
of Placement Preferences of State and Federal Indian Child Welfare Acts, 63 
A.L.R.6th 429 (cumulative supp.) (originally published in 2011). 
 8. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 426–29. 
 9. Id. at 425 (citing Richard v. Hinson, 70 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 10. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)). 
 11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 664 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing 
the stringency of strict scrutiny); see also Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, 
Membership and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1055 n.57 (2012) (citing 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES 671 (3d ed. 
2006)) (“Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged law.”); Douglas 
Linder, Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, UNIV. MO.-KANSAS 
CITY: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm [https://perma.cc/6J4N-DUSR] (“Usually, 
strict scrutiny will result in invalidation of the challenged classification . . . .”). 
 12. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 13. See Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 426 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 
(1974)) (“If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed 
to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of 
the U.S. Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of 
the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”). 
 14. Id. at 427–28. 
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banc.15 The question of whether the ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child” is a race-based or political classification will remain contested 
until the U.S. Supreme Court rules on the question, resolving how 
the balance will be struck between protecting Indian culture and 
enforcing the best interests of Indian children. 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the ICWA, 
including the history and policies behind the ICWA’s adoption, 
judicial policies that resulted from the ICWA, and the ICWA U.S. 
Supreme Court cases. Part II examines the Fifth Circuit holding in 
Brackeen v. Bernhardt that the “Indian child” definition is a 
political, rather than race-based, classification, and argues that the 
Fifth Circuit correctly held that the “Indian child” definition is a 
political classification. Part III, however, notes the ICWA’s “Indian 
child” definition, although constitutional as a political classification 
under the Equal Protection Clause, is flawed, requiring Congress to 
revisit the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition. 
I. Background on the Indian Child Welfare Act 
The ICWA was implemented in response to a national trend of 
Indian children being removed from their homes at disproportional 
rates.16 
A. The Federal Government’s Historical Treatment of 
Indian Children and Culture 
 
But we all survived, though at times the Indianness was almost 
beaten out of us.17 
 
Before Congress implemented the ICWA to protect Indian 
children and culture, the federal government worked to “[k]ill the 
Indian, save the man” by replacing Indian traditional ways of life 
with American culture through forcefully removing and placing 
Indian children in boarding schools beginning in 1869.18 All in all, 
 
 15. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, No. 18-11479, 2019 WL 5847349 at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 
7, 2019) (per curiam). Oral arguments were heard in January, 2020. Julia Dreyer, 
Fifth Circuit Hears Oral Argument on ICWA Case, NAT’L COUNCIL OF URB. INDIAN 
HEALTH (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.ncuih.org/policy_blog?article_id=345 
[https://perma.cc/BKF3-7DQK]. 
 16. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1 (1977). 
 17. Jon Reyhner, American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What 
is Going Right?, 57 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. 58, 59 (2018). 
 18. See History and Culture: Boarding Schools, NATIVE PARTNERSHIP, 
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the government operated as many as 100 boarding schools.19 
Minnesota, for example, had sixteen boarding schools.20 The federal 
government left many Indian families no choice but to forfeit 
guardianship of their children for months and years on end.21 Many 
argue that the boarding schools were tools of ethnic cleansing.22 At 
these boarding schools, Indian children were stripped of their 
Indian identities, forced to cut their hair, made to surrender their 
traditional clothing, forbidden from speaking their languages, told 
to forget their traditional religions, and taught about White 
American history.23 Indian children “were taught that their 
cultures were inferior.”24 Additionally, the children were often 
physically and sexually abused.25 And rather than returning the 
Indian children home to their families and tribes, “[i]t became 
standard policy . . . to adopt them out to white families, all with an 
eye toward white acculturation.”26 
After decades of such cruelty, Congress took some 
compensatory steps by enacting the Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA) of 1934. The purpose of the Act was to “conserve and develop 
Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the right to form 
 
http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/PageServer?pagename=airc_hist_boardingsc
hools [https://perma.cc/PH9L-AS9E] (quoting Col. Richard Henry Pratt, founder of 
the Carlisle Indian School); Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt 
Many, NPR (May 12, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=16516865 [https://perma.cc/H6FZ-3NY5] (further quoting Pratt, 
who stated that “[a] great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead 
one . . . [.] In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian 
there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man.”). 
 19. See Bear, supra note 18. 
 20. See Denise K. Lajimodiere, The Sad Legacy of American Indian Boarding 
Schools in Minnesota and the U.S., MINNPOST (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2016/06/sad-legacy-american-indian-
boarding-schools-minnesota-and-us/ [https://perma.cc/XA8W-YBS4]. 
 21. See Boarding Schools, NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AM. INDIAN, 
https://americanindian.si.edu/education/codetalkers/html/chapter3.html 
[https://perma.cc/4GFM-A5JG]. 
 22. See, e.g, Reyhner, supra note 17, at 72. 
 23. See id.; Boarding Schools, supra note 21. 
 24. Boarding Schools, supra note 21. 
 25. Dan Gunderson, ‘I’ve Never Told Anyone’: Stories of Life in Indian Boarding 
Schools, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/ 
story/2019/10/03/stories-of-life-in-indian-boarding-schools [https://perma.cc/Q3GT-
QRBJ] (“She started whispering about being sexually abused and she said, ‘I don’t 
know why I’m telling you. I have not told anybody.’ Almost every survivor in the book 
experienced sexual abuse, or they witnessed it.”). 
 26. See Lia Kvatum, Who Should Get to Adopt Native American Children?, 
WASH. POST MAG.  (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/ 
wp/2019/04/03/feature/who-should-get-to-adopt-native-american-children/ 
[https://perma.cc/CG48-AQMY] (quoting Matthew Fletcher, a Tribal Law expert and 
an Anishinaabe Indian). 
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business and other organizations; to establish a credit system for 
Indians; to grant certain rights of home rule to Indians; [and] to 
provide for vocational education for Indians . . . .”27 The IRA, 
however, still required Indians to replace their traditional ways of 
life by adopting White American culture.28 In fact, Indian historians 
have argued that “[t]he IRA was the last great drive to assimilate 
the American Indian. It was also a program to colonize the tribes.”29 
B. Indian Child Welfare Act Statutory Provisions 
In 1978, after over a century of Indian children being removed 
from their families and culture, Congress responded by enacting the 
Indian Child Welfare Act.30 In enacting the ICWA, Congress 
recognized that a disproportionate number of Indian children were 
“separated from their natural parents through the actions of 
nontribal government agencies or private individuals or private 
agencies . . . .”31 In particular, Congress found that in 1974 
“approximately 25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated 
from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or 
institutions.”32 Thus, the ICWA was enacted “to protect the rights 
of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian 
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.”33 
i. Definitions 
The ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person 
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian 
tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]”34 The ICWA does 
not define tribal membership eligibility requirements. Further, 
 
 27. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 5101). 
 28. See 1934: President Franklin Roosevelt Signs the Indian Reorganization Act, 
NATIVE VOICES, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nativevoices/timeline/452.html 
[https://perma.cc/JKF2-JBD5] (“[I]n general the new tribal constitutions and bylaws 
were standardized and largely followed the Anglo-American system of organizing 
people. Traditional Indians of almost every tribe strongly objected to this method of 
organizing and criticized the IRA as simply another means of imposing white 
institutions on the tribes.”). 
 29. See Tim Giago, Good or Bad? Indian Reorganization Act Turns 75, 
HUFFPOST: BLOG (Sept. 13, 2009), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/good-or-bad-
indian-reorga_b_284940 [https://perma.cc/7VB7-SKGY] (quoting Rupert Costo, 
Cahuilla historian, publisher, and journalist). 
 30. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963. 
 31. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1 (1977). 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978). 
 33. Id. at 23. 
 34. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
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“Indian tribe” is defined as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for 
the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their 
status as Indians . . . [.]”35 
ii. Jurisdiction over ICWA Proceedings 
The ICWA imposes jurisdictional limits on “Indian child” 
custody proceedings. Indian tribes have sole jurisdiction regarding 
child custody proceedings over Indian children that fall within the 
definition of “Indian child” that are “domiciled within the 
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is 
otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.”36 A state 
court lacks jurisdiction regarding foster care placement or 
termination of parental rights “in the absence of good cause to the 
contrary . . . .”37 If, however, a state court begins a legal proceeding 
regarding a foster care placement or termination of parental rights 
of an “Indian child,” then that Indian child’s tribe has the right to 
intervene in the proceeding at any point.38 Thus, to avoid tribal 
intervention in an involuntary state court proceeding regarding 
foster care placement or termination of parental rights, courts are 
required to notify the Indian child’s family and tribe.39 
iii. Placement Preference 
The ICWA contains strict placement preferences for Indian 
families. In the event parents aim to put their child up for adoption, 
the parents’ tribe may intervene and override their expressed 
wishes under the ICWA.40 An “Indian child” up for adoption, “in the 
absence of good cause to the contrary,” shall be placed with: “(1) a 
member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the 
Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”41 Likewise, strict 
placement preferences are implemented for “Indian child” foster 
care and preadoptive placements.42 
 
 35. § 1903(8). 
 36. § 1911(a). 
 37. § 1911(b). 
 38. Id. 
 39. § 1912(a). 
 40. § 1911(c) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child 
and the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the 
proceeding.”); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). 
 41. § 1915(a). 
 42. These preferences are as follows: 
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C. Tribal Enrollment Requirements 
Tribal enrollment requirements can broaden the number of 
“Indian children” and the scope of the ICWA. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has “recognized that Indian tribes have a right to define tribal 
membership as each tribe sees fit.”43 Historically, tribes have 
embraced eligibility mechanisms such as “[l]anguage, residence, 
cultural affiliation, recognition by a community, degree of ‘blood,’ 
genealogical lines of descent, and self-identification . . . .”44 Blood 
quantum is now the most generally used eligibility mechanism to 
determine tribal membership.45 For example, the Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe requires a one-quarter blood quantum for tribal 
membership eligibility.46 Conversely, the Cherokee Nation does not 
rely on blood quantum. The tribe requires that the individuals must 
be either original enrollees listed on the Dawes Commission Rolls 
or descendants of said enrollees.47 Although many tribal eligibility 
requirements are more stringent than the Cherokee Nation’s, tribes 
will likely amend their tribal eligibility requirements in the near 
future, making their eligibility requirements more lenient as blood 
quanta continue to dilute due to intermarriage.48 Thus, as time 
persists and tribes amend their tribal eligibility requirements, more 
and more Indian children will fall subject to the ICWA’s “Indian 
child” definition. 
 
(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; 
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; 
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian 
licensing authority; or 
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by 
an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian 
child’s needs. 
§ 1915(b). 
 43. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2012). 
 44. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, CHANGING NUMBERS, CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN 
INDIAN DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 105 (Gary D. Sandefur, Ronald R. 
Rindfuss & Barney Cohen eds., 1996). 
 45. Id. at 106 (“Individuals enrolled in federally recognized tribes also receive a 
Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood . . . from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
specifying a certain degree of Indian blood, i.e., a blood quantum.”). 
 46. MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE ENROLLMENT ORDINANCE § IV(A)(3) (2003). 
 47. CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Dawes Rolls, NAT’L ARCHIVES 
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/dawes/tutorial/ 
intro.html [https://perma.cc/8WD7-TDBJ] (Dawes Rolls “are the lists of individuals 
who were accepted as eligible for tribal membership in the ‘Five Civilized Tribes’: 
Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles.”). 
 48. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 44 (“[I]t has been projected that within the 
next century, the proportion of those with a one-half or more blood quantum will 
decline to only 8 percent of the American Indian population, whereas the proportion 
with less than one-fourth blood quantum will increase to around 60 percent.”). 
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D. The Existing Indian Family Exception 
Although the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” has not been 
amended since its enactment in 1978, states have attempted to limit 
its scope through the judicially-created “existing Indian family” 
exception.49 This exception originated in a 1982 Kansas Supreme 
Court case, In re Baby Boy L., where the court held that the ICWA 
did not apply to the proceeding because the ICWA’s purpose is to 
protect an existing Indian family, and that Baby Boy L. was not part 
of an existing Indian family because his Indian father never had 
custody of him.50 After In re Baby Boy L., several more states 
adopted the “existing Indian family” exception,51 but Kansas has 
since overturned its precedent.52 In one case in particular, In re 
Bridget R., a California Court applied its own version of the existing 
family exception, holding that the ICWA was unconstitutional if its 
application was based solely on racial classification, but that it 
could be upheld if its application was based on race and other 
factors.53 Thus, the ICWA was constitutional if its application was 
based not only on a child’s race but also whether the biological 
parents maintain a “significant social, cultural, or political 
relationship with the Tribe.”54 However, In re Bridget R. has been 
superseded and is no longer good law in California.55 
The “existing Indian family exception” has been subject to 
much disagreement among the states. The exception is still valid 
law in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and 
Tennessee.56 In 2016, the Department of Interior expressly rejected 
the exception.57 The existence and use of the exception illustrates 
widespread attempts to limit the ICWA’s application, while its 
 
 49. See ICWA Guide Online: Topic 1. Application, NAT’L INDIAN L. LIBR., 
https://narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/faq/application.html [https://perma.cc/KF9U-
6QYC]. 
 50. In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 174–75 (Kan. 1982). 
 51. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 
N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); In re Morgan, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1997); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995); C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 
S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). 
 52. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009) (abandoning the court’s application 
of the Existing Indian Family Exception due to the conflict between the exception 
and the ICWA language). 
 53. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 54. Id. at 1491. 
 55. In re Vincent M., 150 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(abandoning the court’s application of the Existing Indian Family Exception). 
 56. See supra note 51. 
 57. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 114, 38782 (June 14, 
2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23) (stating that the existing Indian family 
exception “has no basis in ICWA’s text or purpose”). 
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rejection in other states shows such limitations remain 
controversial. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, however, presents the U.S. 
Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve both the growing 
definitional issues and the validity of the existing Indian family 
exception.58 
E. United States Supreme Court ICWA Cases 
The U.S. Supreme Court has heard two cases involving the 
ICWA.59 These cases, Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 
(Holyfield) and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (Adoptive Couple), 
were decided over two decades apart. The cases illustrate the 
Court’s changing views of the ICWA’s applicable scope.60 
In Holyfield, an unwed mother and father, both enrolled 
members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, conceived 
twins.61 However, the couple purposefully gave birth over two 
hundred miles away from the reservation and voluntarily placed 
the twins up for adoption.62 The twins were adopted by a non-Indian 
couple and soon after, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
tribe intervened, moving to vacate the adoption decree on grounds 
that under the ICWA, tribal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
regarding Indian children.63 The biological parents argued that the 
ICWA did not apply because the children were born off of the 
reservation, and thus were never domiciled on the reservation as 
the Act requires.64 Domicile is not defined in the ICWA, and 
therefore the Court considered the domicile definition, ultimately 
holding that the twins were domiciled on the reservation, and that 
the Tribe had jurisdiction.65 Here, the ICWA overrode the parents’ 
wishes to put their children up for adoption. The Court’s broad 
interpretation of domicile strengthened tribal rights under the 
ICWA by allotting tribal jurisdiction over a larger range of “Indian 
children.” 
 
 58. See Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 59. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013). 
 60. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51–53 (broadening the ICWA’s scope by adopting an 
expansive definition of “domicile,” giving Indian tribes jurisdiction over more Indian 
child proceedings); Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 649–51 (narrowing the ICWA 
application of termination of parental rights by holding, in part, that the ICWA does 
not protect parents from involuntary termination of parental rights for Indian 
children where the parent never had custody of the child). 
 61. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32. 
 62. Id. at 37, 51. 
 63. Id. at 38. 
 64. Id. at 39. 
 65. Id. at 53. 
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Conversely, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Court 
restricted some tribal powers under the ICWA. In Adoptive Couple, 
a baby girl who was 1.2% Cherokee was classified as an “Indian 
child” under the ICWA because she met the Cherokee tribe’s 
eligibility requirement.66 The child’s biological mother and father 
were unwed, and the biological father was a member of the 
Cherokee Nation.67 The biological father, even though capable, 
provided no financial assistance to the biological mother or child.68 
The biological father relinquished his parental rights via text 
message before the child’s birth.69 The biological mother voluntarily 
put the child up for adoption, and the child was adopted by a non-
Indian couple.70 The biological father objected to the adoption on 
grounds that ICWA §§ 1912(d)71 and (f)72 bar the termination of his 
parental rights.73 The Court rejected the biological father’s 
arguments because § 1912(f) applies to situations of “continued 
custody,” but here, the biological father never had custody of the 
child.74 Additionally, § 1912(d) “applies only in cases where an 
Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the termination 
of the parent’s rights.”75 Here, the biological mother and father were 
already separated; therefore, the breakup had “long since 
occurred.”76 
Unlike in Holyfield, in Adoptive Couple, the Court limited the 
ICWA’s applicability by applying a narrow reading of the Act’s 
provisions. While Adoptive Couple does not overturn Holyfield, it 
indicates that the Court may have changed its perception of the 
ICWA’s scope. As more constitutional challenges to the ICWA arise, 
 
 66. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 641 (2013). 
 67. Id. at 643–44. 
 68. Id. at 637. 
 69. Id. at 643. 
 70. Id. at 643–44. 
 71. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1978) (“Any party seeking to effect a foster care 
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law 
shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services 
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family 
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”). 
 72. § 1912(f) (“No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the 
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”). 
 73. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 647. 
 74. Id. at 648. 
 75. Id. at 651. 
 76. Id. at 652. 
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such as that in Brackeen v. Bernhardt, how the Court interprets the 
ICWA’s scope may determine the Act’s constitutionality. 
II. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Holding in Brackeen 
v. Bernhardt Should Be Upheld upon the Rehearing en 
Banc 
This section does two things. First, it outlines the District 
Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s holdings as well as explains race-
based and political classifications. Second, it argues that the Fifth 
Circuit should uphold its decision upon its rehearing of Brackeen en 
banc because statutory text, legislative history, and prior U.S. 
Supreme Court case law support the Fifth Circuit’s original decision 
holding the definition of “Indian child” is a political classification 
and therefore constitutional. 
The Brackeen plaintiffs consisted of three families seeking 
adoption of Indian children who were denied because the children 
fell under the ICWA umbrella.77 The three couples struggling to 
adopt Indian children brought a Fifth Amendment equal protection 
challenge to the ICWA, arguing that the ICWA’s definition of 
“Indian child” is a race-based classification and therefore 
unconstitutional.78 Underlying the plaintiffs’ argument in Brackeen 
is the idea that the definition of “Indian child” is overly broad and 
does not effectively work in the best interests of the child or of 
Indian culture as Congress originally intended. The District Court 
held that the ICWA’s definition of an “Indian child” is race-based, 
and therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.79 The Fifth Circuit reversed 
the District Court’s decision, holding that the ICWA’s “Indian child” 
definition was a political classification, and therefore, subject to 
rational basis review.80 This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s 
original holding should be affirmed when it is reconsidered en banc. 
A. Political Classifications v. Race-Based Classifications 
Challenges under equal protection analysis are considered 
under strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis 
review, depending on the nature of the classification.81 Race-based 
 
 77. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 418–20 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 78. Id. at 425–26. 
 79. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 534 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 80. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 429. 
 81. Kristapor Vartanian, Equal Protection, 9 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 495, 498 
(2008). Some argue there is also a “fourth level of scrutiny, ‘rational basis with bite.’” 
Id. at 531 (citation omitted). 
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classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review,82 while political 
classifications are subject to rational basis review.83 In Brackeen, 
the District Court and the Fifth Circuit classified the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” differently. The Northern District of 
Texas District Court based its race-based classification holding on 
the premise that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a 
“blanket exemption for Indians,”84 which mirrors Rice v. Cayetano, 
not Morton v. Mancari. In Rice, the Court overturned a Hawaiian 
voting statute which restricted voter eligibility to only “native 
Hawaiians” and those with Hawaiian ancestry for positions in a 
state agency.85  The Rice Court held that the voting preference “used 
ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose.”86 In 
Mancari, a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Indian hiring preference 
which “applies ‘only to members of “federally recognized” tribes,’” 
and “operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be 
classified as ‘Indians,’”87 was upheld as a political classification.88 
The U.S. Supreme Court limited the Mancari holding, recognizing 
that applying its decision more broadly would raise the “obviously 
more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket 
exemption for Indians.”89 Because an Indian child may be 
considered an “Indian child” under the ICWA’s definition due to 
tribal eligibility,90 rather than actual tribal affiliation,91 the District 
Court found that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” “uses 
ancestry as a proxy for race”92 and is, therefore, a race-based 
classification, like Rice. 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the 
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a political classification, 
subject to rational basis review.93 The Fifth Circuit employed four 
main arguments. First, Congress maintains broad power to 
regulate Indians and Indian tribes both on and off the reservation.94 
 
 82. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 534. 
 83. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 429. 
 84. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 
(1974)). 
 85. Id. at 532. 
 86. Id. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)). 
 87. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). 
 88. Id. (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555). 
 89. Id. at 533 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554). 
 90. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 91. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538 (1974) (stating the BIA hiring preference that 
was based on tribal affiliation). 
 92. Zinke, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 534. 
 93. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 429 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 94. Id. at 428. 
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Second, the “eligibility” qualifier in the ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child” does not subject all Indian children to the ICWA’s 
jurisdiction; therefore, the “Indian child” definition is not based 
solely on tribal ancestry or race.95 Because the ICWA reserves 
Indian tribes the right to determine tribal eligibility requirements, 
tribes have the freedom to determine to whom they offer 
membership. Thus, tribes may elect to admit members without 
Indian blood, or tribes may choose to not admit certain Indian 
persons because they do not fall within the tribal membership 
requirements. Third, the ICWA, unlike the voting preference law in 
Rice, is a federal law congressionally enacted to protect Indian 
children and tribes.96 Fourth, the state election preferences in Rice 
were state affairs, while ICWA adoption proceedings are affairs 
involving states, tribes, and Congress.97 Due to these 
considerations, the Fifth Circuit overturned the District Court 
decision and held that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a 
political classification subject to rational basis review.98 
The courts’ different decisions classifying the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” are crucial because whether the 
definition is classified as race-based or political is dispositive. Under 
the Equal Protection Clause, political classifications are subject to 
rational basis review, while race-based classifications are subject to 
a higher standard of review, strict scrutiny review.99 Application of 
strict scrutiny review requires courts to determine whether the 
classification at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.100 Surviving strict scrutiny review is nearly 
 
 95. Id. at 429. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)) 
(repudiating “‘[d]istinguishing between citizens solely because of their ancestry,’ as 
being ‘odious to a free people . . .’” and emphasizing that, therefore, “the Equal 
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most 
rigid scrutiny’”). See also Bernhardt, 937 F.3d. at 425 (explaining that while 
challenges to a state statute on equal protection grounds are brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, challenges to a federal statute on equal protection grounds 
are brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, in which the Equal 
Protection Clause is implicitly included). 
 100. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (referencing 
Fillilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (concurring opinion)) (“Our action 
today makes explicit [that] . . . Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, 
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to 
further that interest.”). 
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impossible.101 Conversely, a statute is considered a political 
classification if it is based on political characteristics and legitimate 
non-racial goals, such as protecting tribal sovereignty.102 Political 
classifications are subject to rational basis review.103 Rational basis 
review only requires a rational justification for the statutes be 
provided—it is a low bar.104 Thus, a holding that the ICWA’s “Indian 
child” definition is a racial classification will likely find the ICWA, 
in its entirety, unconstitutional, whereas its classification as 
politically-based will preserve the Act’s constitutionality.105 
B. The ICWA’s “Indian Child” Definition Is a Political 
Classification 
Despite the ICWA’s faults, this Article concludes that the 
“Indian child” definition is a political rather than a racial 
classification.106 The Fifth Circuit correctly examined U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent and the history of government special treatment of 
Indian affairs in Brackeen v. Bernhardt.107 The ICWA’s statutory 
text, legislative history, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent support 
the Fifth Circuit’s initial holding that the ICWA’s “Indian child” 
definition is a political classification. 
i. Statutory Text 
The ICWA’s statutory text advances the argument that the 
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a political, not racial, 
classification. The ICWA states “that Congress . . . has assumed the 
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes 
and their resources”108 and that the ICWA’s purpose is to “protect 
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability 
 
 101. See discussion supra note 11. 
 102. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (classifying a BIA hiring 
preference as politically-based because the “preference is reasonably and directly 
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal”). 
 103. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 425. 
 104. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (applying rational basis 
review and upholding a statute because defendant must only show that the statute 
is rational). 
 105. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 426 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552) (“If these laws, 
derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, 
were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States 
Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the 
Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”). 
 106. See id. at 429. 
 107. Id. at 426–29. 
 108. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2). 
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and security of Indian tribes and families . . . .”109 These statements 
establish Congress’ broad interest and assertion of duty to Indian 
culture and welfare that motivated the ICWA’s enactment. It is 
these non-racial goals that were the driving force leading to the 
enactment of the ICWA. 
The operative provisions of the statute reflect the same non-
racial purpose. First, the ICWA favors placement with extended 
family and tribal members so placements “reflect the unique values 
of Indian culture . . . .”110 Family is a core element in Indian 
cultures.111 In many Indian communities, the responsibilities of 
educating and caring for youth is shared by parents, extended 
family, and the entire community.112 Indian homes are often 
multigenerational, housing great-grandparents, grandparents, 
parents, and children.113 Retaining children within their extended 
family and tribe is of utmost importance to Indian cultures.114 
Accordingly, the ICWA’s placement preferences help Congress 
achieve its goal to protect and promote stability in Indian culture. 
Second, the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” allots tribes, 
rather than Congress, discretion to identify parameters for defining 
an “Indian child.”115 The definition states that a child will be 
considered an “Indian child” if the child meets tribal eligibility 
requirements.116 The ICWA, however, does not define tribal 
eligibility requirements. Each tribe maintains discretion to 
determine its own tribal membership requisites. “Among tribal 
nations in the U.S., many different enrollment requirements 
 
 109. Id. § 1902. 
 110. Allison Krause Elder, “Indian” as a Political Classification: Reading the 
Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 417, 421 
(2018) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902). 
 111. See Paul Boyer, Young and Old Alike: Children and the Elderly Are a Priority 
in Native American Cultures, 3 J. AM. INDIAN HIGHER EDUC. 4 (1992), 
https://tribalcollegejournal.org/young-alike-children-elderly-priority-native-
american-cultures/ [https://perma.cc/97DE-TWQY] (describing some typical family 
dynamics in Indian cultures). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Living Conditions, NATIVE AM. AID, http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/ 
PageServer?pagename=naa_livingconditions [https://perma.cc/L6T4-7DUE]. 
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9–10 (1978). 
 115. The ICWA does not set tribal membership requirements, so part (b) of the 
“Indian child” definition may be as expansive as tribes desire. See 25 U.S.C. § 
1903(4). 
 116. Id. 
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exist,”117 including blood quantum,118 lineal descendancy,119 and 
residency.120  As discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Brackeen, tribes 
may restrict or extend membership to any spectrum of children: 
children without any Indian blood may be extended tribal 
membership and children with one-quarter Indian blood quantum 
may be denied membership.121 The ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child” is not a hardline racial or ancestral limitation and is, 
therefore, not a racial classification. Additionally, offering Indian 
tribes a voice in defining their people recognizes tribes’ sovereignty, 
promoting the stability of Indian tribes. 
Third, Congress secured Indian tribes the right to intervene 
and reverse a mutually settled adoption of an “Indian child,” further 
protecting tribal sovereignty and cultural connection. 122  To ensure 
the right of intervention, the ICWA mandates that tribes be notified 
upon custody hearings involving “Indian children.”123 
Congress’s political intentions for the ICWA were clear—
remedying years of separation of Indian children from their culture, 
which tarnished Indian culture and sovereignty. Each of the three 
aforementioned ICWA provisions set Congress’s goals for the ICWA 
and Indian culture in motion. Therefore, Congress not only “talked 
 
 117. Jessica Bardill, Tribal Sovereignty and Enrollment Determinations, AM. 




 118. CROW CREEK SIOUX TRIBE CONST. art. II, § 2 (“Any child, of one-fourth (1/4) 
or more Indian blood born to any member of the Tribe who at the birth of such child 
resided on the reservation shall be entitled to membership.”). 
 119. CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“All citizens of the Cherokee Nation 
must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on the Dawes 
Commission Rolls . . . .”); Bardill, supra note 117 (describing the Cherokee Nation’s 
tribal membership requirement). 
 120. Bardill, supra note 117 (“A residency rule requires that the tribal member 
live within, maintain a residence, or have an allotment among the tribal lands . . . . 
The Cedarville Rancheria, Modoc County, Cedarville, California appears to be the 
only U.S. tribe that still maintains a residency requirement, in combination with a 
lineal descent requirement, for members.”). 
 121. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 428 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 122. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (“Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster 
care placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or 
Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child’s 
tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon 
a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 
of this title.”). 
 123. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (“[W]here the court knows or has reason to know that an 
Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian 
custodian and the Indian child’s tribe . . . .”). 
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the talk” but also “walked the walk” by designing the ICWA to 
reflect their political rather than racial purposes. 
ii. Legislative History 
The ICWA’s legislative history bolsters the argument that the 
ICWA’s “Indian child” definition is a political classification. Prior to 
the ICWA’s passage, Congress discussed and documented the 
importance of protecting Indian children and the Indian 
community,124 noting that Indian children are placed in foster care 
or in adoptive homes five times more frequently than non-Indian 
children, sometimes due to ignorance of Indian familial cultural 
values and social norms.125 A House Report discusses the 
circumstances that affect Indians, which inspired legislative action 
through the ICWA.126 Similarly, a Senate Hearing reviewing the 
implementation of the ICWA echoes the House Report statements, 
confirming the purpose of the ICWA is to protect Indian children as 
well as ongoing traditions and cultures of the tribes and families.127 
As aforementioned in the discussion of the statutory text, Congress 
delegated Indian tribes the right to define what constitutes an 
“Indian child,” and therefore, the statute does not racially classify 
all children that maintain Indian blood or Indian ancestry as 
“Indian children.” Thus, Senate and House discussion regarding the 
protection of “Indian children” is not race-based, but political 
because the legislative materials, like the ICWA’s statutory text, 
discuss “Indian children” with the definitional understanding that 
the ICWA applies only to those children that fit within the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child.” 
Further, the House Report documents that the Committee of 
Interior and Insular Affairs and Department of Justice considered 
the potential Fifth Amendment Equal Protection issue regarding 
the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” before the ICWA was 
enacted. Then Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald raised 
a series of potential concerns regarding the ICWA to the House 
Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs, including whether the 
“Indian child” definition was a racial classification and, therefore, 
subject to strict scrutiny. However, Wald concluded that: 
 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9–10 (1978). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 8–10. 
 127. Oversight on the Implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong. 1–2 (1984) (statements 
by Senator Mark Andrews, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs and John W. 
Fritz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Bureau of Indian Affairs). 
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[t]his problem has been, for the most part, eliminated in the 
subcommittee draft, which defines ‘Indian child’ as ‘any 
unmarried person who is under age 18 and is either (a) a 
member of an Indian tribe or (b) eligible for membership in an 
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe.’128 
 
It is telling that the legislators and the Department of Justice 
considered but dismissed the potential Fifth Amendment equal 
protection issue because it shows they did not think it was a valid 
concern. The Fifth Circuit should follow Wald’s lead, finding the 
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” as a political, not racial, 
classification. 
iii. Prior Case Law that Supports the Fifth Circuit’s 
Decision 
Beyond Brackeen v. Bernhardt, no other cases have decided 
whether the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a racial 
classification.129 The U.S. Supreme Court has, however, addressed 
issues regarding racial classifications, specifically in Morton v. 
Mancari and Rice v. Cayetano, which support finding that the 
definition of “Indian child” is politically-based.130 As 
aforementioned, Mancari and Rice present two different holdings, 
and Mancari controls in Brackeen. 
In Morton v. Mancari, plaintiffs alleged that employment 
preferences for qualified Indians in the BIA, as provided in the IRA 
of 1934, constituted race-based classifications and discrimination, 
violating the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.131 The Court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs, holding the BIA Indian hiring 
preference was a political classification, subject to rational basis 
review.132 To justify the holding, the Court examined the legislative 
history behind the hiring preferences, determining the purpose was 
to “give Indians a greater participation in their own self-
 
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 39 (1978). 
 129. But see A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, 2017 WL 1019685, *1–2, 11 (2017) 
(“[A]dult Plaintiffs and those who have undertaken to speak for the child Plaintiffs 
attempt to challenge parts of the [ICWA] as unconstitutional racial 
discrimination . . . . [A]ll of the pending motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
will be granted, and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
and lack of standing.”). 
 130. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 
(1974). 
 131. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537. 
 132. Id. at 554–55. 
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government; to further the Government’s trust obligation toward 
the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having non-
Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.”133 Thus, 
the Court found that the tribal sovereignty goal behind the BIA 
hiring preference aligns with political classifications.134 Like the 
Mancari BIA hiring preference, the ICWA’s “Indian child” 
definition implicates tribal sovereignty. Without culturally 
connected Indian youth, tribes will cease to exist, undermining the 
existence of tribal sovereignty. The ICWA’s purpose of preserving 
Indian culture should, therefore, align with political classifications. 
Additionally, like the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition, the 
Mancari hiring preference was enacted as part of a federal act, the 
IRA of 1934.135 A court holding that either the BIA Indian hiring 
preference or the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition are racial 
classifications would completely overturn both Acts, not solely 
challenged provisions.136 Even further, as the courts in Mancari and 
Brackeen state, overturning the ICWA as a race-based classification 
would call into question an entire Title of the U.S. Code, and 
damage the federal government’s relations with Indians as it calls 
into question Indian welfare altogether.137 
Congress enacted the IRA and the ICWA due to the “belief that 
institutional changes were required.”138 Both Acts were a response 
to U.S. governmental behavior that exploited and destroyed Indian 
interests.139 Like the Mancari BIA hiring preference, which was 
established with the goal to improve Indian welfare through 
increased sovereignty, the ICWA was established to preserve 
Indian culture through future generations of children. Thus, the 
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” and the BIA hiring preference 
were enacted for reasons beyond race.140 
The Mancari Court noted that the BIA Indian hiring 
preference statute is a “provision applying to a very specific 
 
 133. Id. at 541–42. 
 134. Id. at 555. 
 135. Id. at 542. 
 136. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 426 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mancari, 
417 U.S. at 552). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553. 
 139. Id. at 541 (stating that the purpose of the BIA Indian hiring preference was 
to instill greater Indian participation in their own government); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-1386 (1978), at 8 (stating the purpose of the ICWA). 
 140. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 (“Here, the preference is reasonably and directly 
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal.”). 
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situation”—protecting tribal sovereignty.141 Although the ICWA 
does not explicitly justify its enactment in relation to Indian tribal 
government sustainability, protecting and preserving Indian 
culture through Indian children is effectively related to tribal 
sovereignty. Indian children are future tribal leaders. Without 
Indian children connected to their Indian tribes, tribal sovereignty 
is temporary. So, the ICWA’s goal to preserve and cultivate Indian 
culture is political. 
Unlike the Mancari BIA Indian hiring preference, which is 
limited to Indians applying for BIA positions, the ICWA’s “Indian 
child” definition is more encompassing.142 This broader definition, 
however, should not be determinative for two reasons. First, the 
BIA Indian hiring preference and the ICWA only apply to federally 
recognized tribes.143 There are only 574 federally recognized 
tribes.144 The exact number of non-federally recognized Indian 
tribes is unknown, but the number is substantial.145 In fact, in 2012, 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported the 
existence of around 400 non-federally recognized tribes.146 
Accordingly, the ICWA, like Mancari, “operates to exclude many 
individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’”147 Second, 
the Fifth Circuit notes in Brackeen that the “Indian child” definition 
is not based solely on race or tribal ancestry because the definition 
refrains from defining tribal membership requirements.148 Instead, 
tribes have the right to form their own membership laws.149 Thus, 
federally recognized tribes may extend membership to any child 
 
 141. Id. at 550. 
 142. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (defining “Indian child” as “any unmarried person 
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is 
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of 
an Indian tribe”). 
 143. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (stating the BIA Indian hiring preference 
applies “only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) 
(defining “Indian tribe”). 
 144. See Tribal Nations & the United States: An Introduction, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. 
INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes [https://perma.cc/JEB4-W8QW]. 
 145. Christopher M. Drake, From Invisibility to Liminality: The Imposition of 
Identity Among Non-federally Recognized Tribes Within the Federal 
Acknowledgement Process 15 (Jan. 5, 2018) (unpublished M.A. thesis, City 
University of New York) (on file with CUNY Academic Works) (“The exact number 
of non-federally recognized tribes is not known. According to Russell Thornton’s 
analysis of the 1990 census, only 60% of those identifying as American Indian 
belonged to a federally recognized tribe.”). 
 146. Id. at 15. 
 147. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555 n.24. 
 148. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 428 (5th Cir. 2019); see also 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903(4). 
 149. See discussion supra note 115; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
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they wish, whether or not the child has Indian blood.150 In sum, the 
ICWA’s “Indian child” definition should be considered a political 
classification because it aligns with Mancari. 
In Rice v. Cayetano, plaintiffs claimed that a Hawaii statute, 
which only allowed “Hawaiians”151 the right to vote for state 
trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.152 The Court held the Hawaii election 
preferences violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Further, the Court 
refrained from acknowledging a Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection violation, yet effectively applied a Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis, insisting that “[t]he State’s electoral 
restriction enacts a race-based voting qualification.”153 The Rice 
holding sets a new limitation on political classifications that 
implicate race: If political classifications are employed in 
democratic electoral processes, the classification, even if presenting 
a previously non-suspect classification, will be considered a suspect 
race-based classification and violate the Fifteenth Amendment.154 
Therefore, Rice complicates political classifications, forcing analysis 
of the activity in which the racial group is engaged and raising 
uncertainty about the future protection that racial groups, like 
Indians, will be afforded through political classifications. 
The Rice holding does not control Brackeen for two reasons. 
First, the definitions of “Native Hawaiian” and “Hawaiian” in 
Hawaii’s voting preference, unlike the ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child,” immediately excluded all individuals who did not fit into the 
ancestral classification from voting.155 As discussed in further detail 
above in the “Statutory Text” section,156 the ICWA’s definition of 
“Indian child” operates much differently, allotting each Indian tribe 
discretion in their membership eligibility requirements.157 The 
ICWA’s definition invites Indian tribes to evaluate who they view 
 
 150. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 428. 
 151. Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 3 MICH. L. 
REV. 491, 497 (2000) (defining “Native Hawaiian” as “any descendant of not less than 
one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 
1778”). 
 152. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000). 
 153. Id. at 517. 
 154. Id. at 495–96. 
 155. Id. at 514–17 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race . . . . Ancestral tracing of this 
sort achieves its purpose by creating a legal category which employs the same 
mechanisms, and causes the same injuries, as laws or statutes that use race by 
name.”). 
 156. See supra section II.B.i. 
 157. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
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as an “Indian child.”158 Second, the Court dismissed the State’s 
argument that the Hawaii voting preference should receive the 
same political classification that the Indian hiring preference in 
Mancari was assigned. The Court acknowledged that the Court and 
Congress have a long history of recognizing special status and 
preferences for Indians, and the Court displays hesitancy to apply 
that special status—particularly the political classification—to 
Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians.159 Unlike Rice, Brackeen 
addresses an issue related to Indians,160 and the Court has 
historically allotted special preferences for Indians. Thus, Mancari, 
not Rice, should control Brackeen, and the Court should hold that 
the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a political classification 
subject to rational basis review. 
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit’s original holding in Brackeen 
v. Bernhardt was correct. The ICWA’s statutory text, legislative 
history, and precedent all support the finding that the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” is a political classification. Upon 
rehearing the case, the Fifth Circuit should affirm its prior holding, 
classifying the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition as political. 
III. A Call to Congress: The ICWA’s “Indian Child” 
Definition Deserves to Be Revisited 
The ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” has not been amended 
since enactment in 1978.161 Congress should revisit the ICWA to 
improve the effectiveness of the statute. Protecting Indian culture 
should remain at the forefront of discussion, but everyone—
Representatives, Senators, social workers, and Indians—should 
contribute to reach an improved ICWA. The ICWA must better 
serve the interests of Indian children. There must be a preferable 
solution that offers: 1) continued preservation of Indian culture; 2) 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518–19 (describing Congress’ long history and ability to 
afford Indians special treatment under the law). 
 160. Native Hawaiians are not considered “Indians” in the eyes of the federal 
government, which does not maintain any government-to-government relationship 
with Native Hawaiians as it would with a federally-recognized tribe. See Michael 
Grass, As Feds Hold Hearings, Native Hawaiians Press Sovereignty Claims, ROUTE 
FIFTY (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.route-fifty.com/management/2014/08/hawaii-
sovereignty-department-interior-hearings/91247/ [https://perma.cc/X4KH-SEEE]; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Considers Procedures to 
Reestablish a Government-to-Government Relationship with the Native Hawaiian 
Community (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interior-
considers-procedures-to-reestablish-a-government-to-government-relationship-
with-the-native-hawaiian-community [https://perma.cc/7UCM-GABP]. 
 161. 25 U.S.C. § 1901. 
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greater deference to Indian parents’ regarding how their children 
are raised; and 3) Indian children more avenues for adequate 
homes. This Note is a call to reexamine, amend, and advocate for an 
improved “Indian child” definition and an improved ICWA. This 
section provides themes to be considered upon revisiting the ICWA. 
A. Burden of Proof 
The ICWA imposes a higher burden of proof to terminate 
parental rights of Indian children from troubling home situations 
than non-Indian children from similar situations.162 The ICWA 
requires a finding “supported by evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the 
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is 
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child” 
to terminate parental rights of an “Indian child.”163 Unlike the 
burden of proof required under the ICWA, in Santosky v. Kramer, 
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” requirement found in the ICWA to non-Indian cases because 
“the psychiatric evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment 
proceedings is rarely susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”164 Because of the broadness of the ICWA’s definition of 
“Indian child,” many Indian children struggle from limited 
protection under the ICWA. Thus, as Congress reevaluates the 
ICWA and its definition of “Indian child,” Congress should consider 
the high burden of proof required to remove Indian children from 
troubling situations. But Congress must also remember that these 
higher burdens of proof regarding removal of “Indian children” were 
implemented in response to the disproportionately high number of 
Indian children being removed from their families, threatening 
Indian culture.165 
 
 162. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (stating that the placement of an “Indian child” 
in foster care requires a finding of “clear and convincing evidence, including 
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by 
the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the child”), and § 1912(f) (stating that termination of parental rights over 
an “Indian child” requires the same finding, but “supported by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (declining to 
adopt the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to terminate non-Indian parental 
rights). 
 163. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). 
 164. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–69. 
 165. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1 (1977). 
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B. Geography and Blood Quantum 
Congress should reconsider the ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child” in light of tribes’ changing tribal enrollment requirements 
and geographic locations. There are 574 federally recognized 
American Indian tribes.166 Of the nearly 5.2 million Indians in the 
U.S., as of 2010, only about 22 percent lived on Indian reservations 
or other trust lands, leaving 78 percent of Indians geographically 
distanced from their tribal lands.167 Regardless of their geographic 
location, each child who qualifies as an “Indian child” remains 
subject to the ICWA because the child’s tribe always has a right to 
intervene at any point or invalidate a termination of parental rights 
and foster care placement.168 Thus, children with little to no 
preexisting ties to their Indian heritage are subject to the ICWA’s 
stringent restrictions. 
Not all Indian tribes have blood quantum enrollment 
requirements,169 and each Indian tribe has the right to determine 
the minimum blood quantum requirement should they choose to 
implement the requirement.170 Due to high levels of interracial 
marriages and relationships throughout the years, Indian blood 
quanta have weakened,171 excluding countless Indians from tribal 
enrollment as they are unable to meet their particular tribe’s 
specific blood quantum enrollment requirements. In response, 
tribes have begun discussions regarding loosening tribal enrollment 
requirements to allow more Indians to qualify, implicating 
individuals geographically distanced from tribes.172 While 
 
 166. See Tribal Nations & the United States: An Introduction, supra note 144. 
 167. See Living Conditions, supra note 113. 
 168. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). 
 169. See, e.g., CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“All citizens of the Cherokee 
Nation must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on the 
Dawes Commission Rolls . . . .”). 
 170. Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The Reliance on Minimum 
Blood Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in the Allotment Acts 
and the Post-adoptive Couple Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA, 43 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 801, 805 (2017). 
 171. See Haeyoun Park, Who Is Marrying Whom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/29/us/20110130
mixedrace.html?ref=us [https://perma.cc/93PU-BZ6C] (demonstrating that Native 
Americans have the highest rate of interracial marriage of all studied racial groups). 
 172. See Nicole MartinRogers & Tom Gillaspy, Minnesota Chippewa Tribe 
Population Projections: Methodology Report, WILDER RESCH. 8 (May 2014), 
https://www.mnchippewatribe.org/pdf/MCT%20Methodology%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R8XV-RHQG]. The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe conducted a study 
to examine population projections and membership requirements. The study found 
that over 28,000 individuals are “multi-race American Indian with some relationship 
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expanding tribal enrollment requirements may be beneficial to 
tribes and some newly qualifying individuals, expansion will likely 
place more Indian children under the ICWA umbrella from more 
remote geographic locations.173 Therefore, the less stringent tribal 
enrollment requirements are, the more remote connections 
individuals will have to their eligible tribes.174 Challenges to the 
ICWA regarding children with minute blood quantum levels and 
few ties to tribes will likely increase upon tribal enrollment 
expansions as more children will fall under the ICWA umbrella. 
Thus, Congress must consider trends in Indians’ geographic 
locations as well as implications for expansive tribal enrollment 
requirements upon revisiting the ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child.” 
Conversely, Congress should also consider that as more 
Indians are distanced further from their tribes, both due to 
geography and blood quantum, there is a greater need than ever to 
retain the broad definition of “Indian child” to protect Indian 
culture. 
C. The ICWA’s Deterrence Effect 
The ICWA enforces a preference system for adopting or 
fostering Indian children that aims to place the children with other 
Indian families.175 However, too often, there are not enough Indian 
foster families across the nation, forcing tribes to place the children 
in non-Indian homes.176 Unfortunately, the difficulties the ICWA 
 
to the Chippewa” who live in the five-state area (Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and Michigan) but who are not enrolled Chippewa members. It is 
projected that about 50% of these 28,451 non-enrolled individuals are likely eligible 
under the tribe’s current one-quarter blood quantum enrollment requirement. If, 
however, the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe lowers the enrollment minimum to a one-
eighth requirement, about 75% of these individuals would likely qualify for 
enrollment. Chippewa tribal members recognize that their culture cannot be carried 
on without a tribe, thus the Chippewa Tribe is considering its options. 
 173. Id. at 7 (stating that if the Minnesota Chippewa tribe expands tribal 
enrollment requirements, the number of Indian adults and children implicated 
within the five-state area could dramatically increase). 
 174. See Fain & Nagle, supra note 170, at 810 (quoting Complaint, A.D. v. 
Washburn, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz. July 26, 2017) (No. 2:15-CV-01259-NVW)) 
(“[I]n many instances, children with only a minute quantum of Indian blood and no 
connection or ties to the tribe are subject to ICWA and relegated to the tribe’s 
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.”). 
 175. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under 
State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, 
to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members 
of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”). 
 176. See Debra Utacia Krol, Inside the Native American Foster Care Crisis Tearing 
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imposes on non-Indian individuals adopting Indian children, such 
as the tribe’s unconditional right to intervene in “Indian child” 
adoptions,  deters non-Indian individuals from fostering Indian 
children.177 Therefore, Congress should discuss the ICWA’s 
potential deterrence effect upon fostering Indian children and its 
potential ramifications on Indian children upon review of the 
ICWA’s “Indian child” definition. During these deliberations, 
Congress might consider narrowing the ICWA’s definition of 
“Indian child”178 or amending and limiting the scope of tribal ability 
to intervene in any foster care or adoption proceeding regarding an 
“Indian child.”179 
D. Policy Propositions 
Improving the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” should be a 
joint effort between Indian leaders and Congress. Protecting Indian 
culture is essential, and the ICWA attempts to act as a protective 
guide; however, it is flawed. Without sufficient support 
mechanisms, Indian foster homes, and resources, the statute cannot 
perform as intended. There must be a better way to ensure 
protection and preservation of Indian culture while also placing a 
stronger emphasis on the best interests of Indian children. Without 
further explanation, Judge Amy Pellman, a family law judge in Los 
Angeles stated, “some tweaks in the law” might fix the ICWA’s 
challenges.180 Although there is consensus that the ICWA is flawed, 
the mode to remedy the flaws is unclear. What is clear, though, is 
that jointly, Congress and Indians should review the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” and discuss its positive and negative 
effects on Indian culture and Indian children. 
 
Families Apart, VICE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a34g8j/ 
inside-the-native-american-foster-care-crisis-tearing-families-apart 
[https://perma.cc/6C6Q-P3WA] (“With a disproportionate number of Native kids 
removed from their homes each year, the need for Native foster homes is huge—and 
there aren’t enough to meet the need. That shortage leads to non-Native foster 
parents taking in kids from tribal communities. Sometimes, those foster parents 
decide they want to adopt the foster child even though the law is supposed to prevent 
virtually all such non-Native adoptions. This has led to nasty fights over custody[.]”). 
 177. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent case regarding the ICWA, the Court 
recognized the ICWA’s potential deterrence effect regarding adoption of Indian 
children and sought to mitigate those negative consequences. Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 653–54 (2013). 
 178. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 179. § 1911(c). 
 180. See Gabby Deutch, A Court Battle Over a Dallas Toddler Could Decide the 
Future of Native American Law, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/indian-child-welfare-acts-
uncertain-future/582628/ [https://perma.cc/V9P3-JN63]. 
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The parties may consider the following when discussing 
potential amendments to the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child.” If 
the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” was narrowed by striking or 
limiting part (b),181 the “eligibility” provision, Congress might 
consider publishing a formal document encouraging and requesting 
the foster care system to work together and form strong alliances 
with Indian tribes to carry out goals that preserve Indian culture 
while also acting in the best interests of Indian children. For 
example, tribes and state and tribal foster care systems can offer 
Indian cultural education sessions for Indian children placed in 
non-Indian homes and sessions for non-Indian foster and adoptive 
parents. These cultural education sessions could teach the children 
and adults about an Indian child’s particular tribal history as well 
as Indian culture and history more generally. Additionally, the 
tribes and state and tribal foster care systems could organize 
support groups or big-brother/big-sister type relationships for 
Indian children placed with non-Indian parents to explore their 
cultural ties. 
If, however, the definition of “Indian child” is not adapted, 
Congress might add a provision to the ICWA allowing parents of a 
qualifying “Indian child” an election right to opt out of the ICWA. A 
provision of this type relates to the issue presented in Miss. Band 
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. As aforementioned, in Holyfield, 
the Indian parents purposefully left the reservation to give birth to 
their twins in hopes that their children would not be considered 
domiciled on the reservation and the ICWA would not apply.182 
Regardless of the parents’ purposeful actions to avoid the ICWA, 
the Court held that the twins, who were adopted by a non-Indian 
couple, fell subject to the ICWA.183 An amendment of this nature 
would offer parents autonomy over their children’s future, which to 
a certain extent, the ICWA’s current form prevents. Additionally, 
as discussed above, Congress might also consider an amendment 
that lowers the currently demanding burden of proof the ICWA 
requires to remove Indian children to temporary foster care and to 
terminate parental rights. The goal behind these propositions is to 
sustain the ICWA’s emphasis on protecting Indian culture while 
also finding a happy medium regarding the best interests of Indian 
children. 
 
 181. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b). 
 182. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37–39 (1989). 
 183. Id. at 53. 
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These propositions require more discussion and evaluation; 
however, they demonstrate ideas aiming to support Indian cultural 
preservation and improve the ICWA’s treatment and applicability 
to the “Indian child.” Again, reviewing and improving the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” must be a joint effort between Indian 
leaders and Congress. 
Conclusion 
American Indians have historically faced cruelty at the hands 
of the U.S. government comparable to the type of cruelty the U.S. 
ferociously fought against in World War II.184 Addressing the U.S.’ 
past failure to respect and preserve American Indian culture cannot 
and should not be forgotten. The ICWA works to preserve Indian 
culture.185 Without it, many “[t]ribes fear that invalidating the 
ICWA on a racial basis has the potential to create a domino effect, 
bringing down the rest of American Indian law with it.”186 However, 
the ICWA has faults that require attention. There must be a better 
solution. 
This Note examines a recent Fifth Circuit case, Brackeen v. 
Bernhardt, which challenges the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” 
on equal protection grounds, claiming the definition is race-based, 
and therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.187 The Fifth Circuit 
correctly overturned the District Court, holding that the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” is a political classification, not a race-
based classification, and therefore, subject to rational basis 
review.188 The ICWA’s statutory text, legislative history, and 
precedent indicate that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” was 
designed with a particular political purpose: protecting Indian 
culture and Indian children. The Fifth Circuit’s holding that the 
definition of “Indian child” is a political classification allows Indian 
children to receive the special protections they deserve. It is, 
however, the U.S. government’s and Indian leaders’ responsibilities 
 
 184. See Hitler Studied U.S. Treatment of Indians, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/hitler-studied-u-s-
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for how he would treat Jewish people); see also ZIIBIWING CTR. OF ANISHINABE 
CULTURE & LIFEWAYS, AMERICAN INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOLS: AN EXPLORATION OF 
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genocide, and internment camps organized by the U.S.). 
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 186. See Deutch, supra note 180. 
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 188. Id. at 429. 
2021] Indian Child Welfare Act 219 
to ensure these special protections do not disadvantage Indian 
children along the way. I do not have the answer to solve the issues 
facing the ICWA’s definition of an “Indian child.” However, growing 
up in a rural community within twenty miles of two Indian 
Reservations and observing close friends fostering Indian children, 
I have seen Indian culture regaining strength through its youth; but 
I have also seen the ICWA fail to protect Indian children. The 
conversation regarding the ICWA and the ICWA’s definition of 
“Indian child” must be reignited for the sake of both Indian culture 
and Indian children. Negative consequences resulting from the 
ICWA and its definition of “Indian child” will not cease without 
conversation, decisions, and cooperation. Congress owes this effort 
to American Indians and their culture. 
 
